Memorandum of Conversation
November 26, 1975
With Foreign Minister Catchai Chunhawan
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
...
The Secretary {Sec}: What is the Cambodian attitude?
Foreign Minister {FM}: The Cambodians want salt and fish. They want to barter for these items.
Sec: Did Ieng Sary impress you?
FM: He is a nice, quiet man.
Sec: How many people did he kill? Tens of thousands?
Habib: Nice and quietly!!
FM: Not more than 10,000. That's why they need food. If they had killed everyone, they would not need salt and fish. All the bridges in Cambodia were destroyed. There was no transportation, no gas. That's why they had to chase the people away from the capital.
Sec: But why with only two hours' notice?
FM: (Shrugs.)
Sec: What do the Cambodians think of the United States? You should tell them that we bear no hostility towards them. We would like them to be independent as a counterweight to North Vietnam.
FM: Are you a member of the Domino Club?
Sec: I am.
FM: The outer, most exposed belt of dominos is Cambodia and Laos. Thailand is in the inner belt and is less exposed.
Sec: We would prefer to have Laos and Cambodia aligned with China rather than with North Vietnam. We would try to encourage this if that is what you want.
FM: Yes, we would like you to do that.
Sec: And then after we do it you can kick us around. You can call Ambassador Anan home and thereby keep the students happy.
FM: The right wing is what we really have to worry about, not the left. The Chinese are 100 percent in support of Cambodia's being friends with Thailand.
Sec: We don't mind Chinese influence in Cambodia to balance North Vietnam. As I told the Chinese when we last met when we were discussing the Vietnamese victory in Indochina, it is possible to have an ideological victory which is a geopolitical defeat. The Chinese did not disagree with me.
FM: The South Vietnamese are not at all happy with the Northerners.
Sec: The North Vietnamese have to be the meanest people in the world. The North Koreans and Albanians are pretty difficult, but the North Vietnamese are by far the worst. They can lie to you effortlessly.
...
Sec: Are there any blond Vietnamese? {Continuing banter about straight hair Vietnamese.}
Anyway, the Vietnamese in Paris used to make the same speech every morning. They used to say that if we would make a major effort, they would would make a major effort. One morning the leader of the Vietnamese delegation said that if we would make a major effort, they would make an effort. At the end of the speech, I asked whether I had understood or whether he had in fact dropped an adjective. He explained that yesterday they had made a major effort, but we had only made an effort. So today we would have to make a major effort and they in turn would only make an effort.
Ambassador Anan: That's very interesting.
...
Sec: We would support this {Chinese take over of road building in northern Laos.}. You should also tell the Cambodians that we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won't let that stand in our way. We are prepared to improve relations with them. Tell them the latter part, but don't tell them what I said before.
Ambassador Anan: The Lao want to be out from under Soviet influence. Perhaps they would like to have the Chinese.
FM: The Lao Government leans toward the Vietnamese and the Soviets, but the Lao people lean toward Thailand. They are having a difficult time now.
Sec: Why?
FM: Because we have closed the border and they cannot get the things they need.
Mr. Habib: Will you reopen the border if they return your patrol boat?
FM: We will keep the border closed until they decide to act in a more friendly fashion.
Sec: You must act firmly. That's the only way to deal with the Communists.
...
Sec: Our policy is to preserve the independence of the Southeast Asian countries. We will help to modernize your forces. We will support you diplomatically.
(Toast) Mr. Minister, this is an informal lunch, but I want you to know that we feel that Thailand is an old friend and we appreciate your support during a difficult conflict. We will not forget what you did, and we will not forget Thailand. I would therefore like to propose a toast to you, Mr. Minister, and to all those who came with you. (Rises and proposes a toast to Chatchai.)
...
FM: ...
The Chinese fully support the Cambodians.
Sec: What do the Chinese say about Vietnamese?
FM: They talk a lot about hegemony.
Sec: I put that in my speech in Detroit.
...
FM: On our side, it is all O.K. There is no problem {moving funds around and weapons depot for ASEAN countries}. It is only on your side--with your press--that there seems to be any problem.
Sec: The press is impossible.
FM: Ours is also troublesome. The problem is now that we have too much democracy.
National Security Archive Publishes Digitized Set of 2,100 Henry Kissinger "Memcons" Recounting the Secret Diplomacy of the Nixon-Ford Era
* An early "back channel" meeting where Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin showed concern that the Nixon administration might escalate the Vietnam War: Kissinger replied that "it would be too bad if we were driven in this direction because it was hard to think of a place where a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made less sense"
* In his first high-level secret meeting with the North Vietnamese, August 1969, Kissinger warns Hanoi that without diplomatic progress, "we will be compelled - with great reluctance - to take measures of the greatest consequence"
* During secret talks with Zhou Enlai in June 1972, Kissinger explained U.S. Vietnam strategy. Following his "decent interval" approach, Kissinger argued that the White House could not accept Hanoi's proposals to eject South Vietnamese leaders from power, but would accept the political changes that could occur after the United States withdrew forces from Vietnam: "if, as a result of historical evolution it should happen over a period of time, if we can live with a Communist government in China, we ought to be able to accept it in Indochina"
* During a Vietnam strategy session in August 1972, Kissinger had a livid reaction to the "indecent haste" with which the "treacherous" Japanese had just recognized China
* In the final stages of the Vietnam negotiations, South Vietnamese officials objected strongly to proposed settlement with Hanoi. With the agreement leaving North Vietnamese forces in the South, one official complained to Kissinger about the "overwhelming problems. If you present someone with a question, he does not wish to die either by taking poison or by a dagger. What kind of an answer do you expect?"
* Discussing Cambodia with Thailand's Foreign Minister, Kissinger acknowledged that the Khmer Rouge were "murderous thugs" but he wanted the Thais to tell the Cambodians "that we will be friends with them": Cambodia aligned with China could be a "counterweight" to the real adversary, North Vietnam.
...
Document 17: Memorandum of Conversation, "Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Chatchai of Thailand," 26 November 1975, 1:00 p.m., State Department, Secret/Nodis
Months after the Indochina debacle, Kissinger had an "informal lunch" with Chatchai Chunhawan, Foreign Minister in the civilian government that came to power after the October 1973 student revolution against the military regime. Part of the new regime's agenda included normalization of relations with Beijing, so China (including Mao's physical condition, prospects for Deng Xiaoping, and the Chinese role in Southeast Asia) came up at several points during the conversation. Another agenda item for the Thai government was the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Thailand; as Kissinger indicated, negotiations had settled most of the issues except for the more sensitive issue of the U-2 deployments in Thailand (they would be redeployed to South Korea in 1976). The conversation, which moved easily from serious issues to banter, touched on the forces withdrawal issue, military aid, and especially regional problems, including the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. Recognizing that Cambodia was controlled by "murderous thugs," Kissinger nevertheless wanted the Thais to tell the Cambodians "that we will be friends with them." That was because he saw Cambodia as a useful "counterweight", especially if aligned with China, to the real adversary, "North Vietnam." Thus, "our strategy is to get the Chinese into Laos and Cambodia as a barrier to the Vietnamese."
According to Tad Szulc,Then there was the question of continued military assistance to Laos and Cambodia. The Paris agreement on Vietnam did not restrict foreign assistance, but it urged that it be halted at the "earliest possible time." The [Nixon] administration hoped to be able indefinitely to shore up friendly forces in both countries (although Congress was reluctant) and the State Department paper noted that a halt "could not occur until cease-fire agreements were concluded in Laos and Cambodia and, perhaps, until subsequent political settlement agreements were concluded in these countries." This reference was designed to make sure that weapons would flow, especially to Cambodia, for a very long time.
Tad Szulc. 1978. The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years. New York, Viking, p. 674.
BarefootGen wrote:And this:Discussing Cambodia with Thailand's Foreign Minister, Kissinger acknowledged that the Khmer Rouge were "murderous thugs" but he wanted the Thais to tell the Cambodians "that we will be friends with them": Cambodia aligned with China could be a "counterweight" to the real adversary, North Vietnam.
National Security Archive
Memorandum of Understanding